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301-Plaintiff union brought
suit in a federal district court under section 301 of the LMRA1 alleging that
defendant employer had breached the collective agreement between them by
failing to· pay some four thousand employees covered by the agreement for
a day on which they did not work. Section 30l(a) permits suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a union without respect to the
amount in controversy or the citizenship of the parties. Plaintiff sought a
declaratory judgment as to the rights of the parties under the agreement, an
accounting to determine the amounts of the wages withheld, and a judgment
running to the individual employees entitled to relief. On appeal from an
order of the district court dismissing the complaint for failure to state a cause
of action, held, order vacated. The complaint should have been dismissed
for want of federal jurisdiction, since this suit was upon the "individual contracts of hire'' and was not a suit for violation of a contract between an employer and a labor organization within the meaning of section 30l(a).2 Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees -v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,
(3d Cir. 1954) 210 F. (2d) 623.
The agreement resulting from negotiations between a union and an employer has been described variously as a set of employment usages which are
incorporated into the contract of each employee as he is hired, 3 as a contract
made by the union as agent for the employees,4 and as a contract which the
Sus o~ CoLLBCTIVB AGRBBMBNT UNDBR SBCTION

lLabor-Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. L. 156, §301 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
(1952) §185.
2For application of §301 generally,'see 17 A.L.R. (2d) 614 (1951).
s Yazoo & M.V.R. Co. v. Webb, (5th Cir. 1933) 64 F. (2d) 902; Cross Mountain
Coal Co. v. Ault, 157 Tenn. 461, 9 S.W. (2d) 692 (1928).
4Mueller v. Chicago & N.W. R. Co., 194 Minn. 83, 259 N.W. 798 (1935); Maisel
v. Sigman, 123 Misc. 714, 205 N.Y.S. 807 (1924).
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employees may enforce as third party beneficiaries.5 The theory of the agreement worked out by the court in the principal case is that it is entirely a
contract between the union and the employer, but that the employer is bound
by operation of law to include in his contract with each employee all the
terms of the collective agreement which are relevant to the individual employment relation. Having done so, the employer has discharged his obligation to
the union as to these terms so that any subsequent breach of them is not a
breach of the collective agreement but a breach of the "individual contracts of
hire."6 While this analysis may be supportable theoretically, it does not lead
to satisfactory results in this kind of case, since section 30I(a) would appear
to authorize only suits on the collective agreement and since the argument
that a union may bring an action for wages due its members under section
30I(b) 7 has already been effectively refuted.8 The result in the present
case is that the claims of four thousand employees must be settled in a state
court,9 possibly without any right of intervention by the union, even though
their claims are based solely on a disputed interpretation of a collective
agreement which section 30l(a) was supposed to make enforceable in the
federal courts.10 The federal courts which have been confronted with this
kind of suit so far have generally assumed that they had jurisdiction under
section 30I(a) 11 even when the asserted violation by the employer concerned
5MacKay v. Loew's, Inc., (9th Cir. 1950) 182 F. (2d) 170; Yazoo & M.V.R. Co. v.
Sideboard, 161 Miss. 4, 133 S. 669 (1931). On theories of the collective agreement generally, see 18 A.L.R. (2d) 352 (1951).
6 The court relies mainly on J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 64 S.Ct. 576
(1943), although this decision would seem as good an argument for the third party beneficiary theory as for the theory adopted by the court.
7 Sec. 30l(b) provides: " ••• Any such labor organization may sue or be sued as an
entity and in behalf of the employees whom it represents in the courts of the United States."
The waiver of diversity of citizenship and amount in controversy requirements found in
§30l(a) does not reappear in §30l(b). 61 Stat. L. 156, §301 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1952)
§185(b).
s The courts have pointed out that if §30l(b) were a general grant of jurisdiction to
the federal courts to hear actions by and against labor unions, there would have been no
need for §§301(a) and 303(b). Evidently the latter sections create federal substantive
rights which may be enforced without regard to diversity jurisdiction whereas §30l(b)
merely makes plain the right of unions to be made a party to suits in federal courts.
Amazon Cotton Mill Co. v. Textile Workers Union of America, (4th Cir. 1948) 167 F.
(2d) 183; Murphy v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees Union, (D.C. Mich. 1951) 102 F.
Supp. 488.
9 It already seems well settled that individuals have no right of action under §301.
United Protective Workers Local 2 v. Ford Motor Co., (7th Cir. 1952) 194 F. (2d) 997;
Schatte v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, (9th Cir. 1950) 182 F.
(2d) 158; Ketcher v. Sheet Metal Workers International Assn., (D.C. Ark. 1953) 115
F. Supp. 802.
10 The extent to which §301 would make the agreement enforceable by unions was
not considered by Congress; the sole concern was to make the agreement enforceable
against the union and to make sure that union funds could be reached. NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF LMRA 336-337, 421-424, 475-477 (1948).
11Local 793, U.A.W.-C.I.O. v. Auto Specialties Mfg. Co., (D.C. Mich. 1951) 19
CCH Lab. Cas. ,i66,162; United Auto Workers v. Wilson Athletic Goods Mfg. Co., (D.C.
ill. 1950) 18 CCH Lab. Cas. ,i65,867; United Shoe Workers of America v. Le Danne
Footwear Co., (D.C. Mass. 1949) 83 F. Supp. 714.
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only one employee.12 The further question raised by the court in the principal case as to the binding effect of such an action on employees not joined
should not prove an insuperable obstacle to a suit by the union. It may be
that the individuals would not be concluded. The Supreme Court has held
in a similar case under the Railway Labor Act that employees who did not
have notice of the proceedings would not be bound by the resulting adjustment.13 The same problem arises in connection with spurious class actions14
but that has not been considered a bar to such an action.15 Another possible
approach is suggested by one district court, which has indicated that upon
a finding for the union there could be a hearing to determine the damages
of the individual employees.16 However, even if there is no theory on
which relief can be obtained for the employees in this type of action, the
union should still be allowed to maintain an action for a declaratory judgment
regarding the meaning of the collective agreement. The legal interest of the
union in the proper interpretation of its contract is given tacit recognition in
the LMRA,17 and was made the basis of decision by the Sixth Circuit in the
only other court of appeals case18 that has considered fully the matter of
federal jurisdiction under section 301 in a situation like the one presented
in the instant case. Even before passage of the LMRA, a federal district court
concluded that a union could maintain an action for a declaratory judgment
as to the wages due under the collective agreement even though it could not
maintain an action to recover those wages for the benefit of the individual
employees.19 Although the court in the principal case did not consider the
possibility of a declaratory judgment, its decision places it squarely in conffict
with the Sixth Circuit. A decision by the Supreme Cou1;1 is apparently in order.
Robert C. Fox, S.Ed.

12 United Protective Workers Local 2 v. Ford Motor Co., note 9 supra.
1s Elgin, J. & E. Ry. Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 65 S.Ct. 1282 (1945).
14 Apparently the only bar to bringing this suit as a class action is that the union as
sucli is not damaged in the same way as the employees are and hence not one of the class.
15 Oppenheimer v. F. J. Young & Co., (2d Cir. 1944) 144 F. (2d) 387.
1s Local 937, U.A.W.-C.I.O. v. Royal Typewriter Co., (D.C. Conn. 1949) 88 F.
Supp. 669. See also Food & Service Trades Council v. Retail Associates, (D.C. Ohio 1953)
ll5 F. Supp. 221.
17 A proviso to §9(a) says that a bargaining representative must be given an opporttmity to be present at any adjustment of grievances. 61 Stat. L. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
(1952) §l59(a).
lSA.F.L. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., (6th Cir. 1950) 179 F. (2d) 535.
19 Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago, Local 753 v. Associated Milk Dealers,
(D.C. ill. 1941) 42 F. Supp. 584.

